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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Qualitative Governmental Interest Analysis: New 
York's Conflict of Laws Rules in Transition-
George v. Douglas Aircraft , Co.* 
The traditional choice of law rule for torts is that the law of the 
place of wrong is determinative of all substantive issues.1 This rule 
has been frequently criticized2 and has been rejected by the Restate-
ment (Second), Conf/,ict of Laws,3 and by a few courts,4 particularly 
those of New York.5 The successor to the traditional approach, how-
ever, has not been determined. Under the view of the Restatement 
(Second), the applicable substantive law is that law of the state which 
has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with 
the parties.6 Although a qualitative approach would seem possible 
under this test,7 a quantitative approach has generally been utilized,8 
adopting the law of the state with the greatest number of significant 
contacts.9 A qualitative evaluation, however, contemplates a weigh-
ing of the governmental interests growing out of the contacts10 
• !1!12 F.2d 7!! (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964). 
I. llEsTATEMENT, CONFUcr OF LAws § 384 (1934): "(l) If a cause of action in tort 
is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action. will be recognized in other states. 
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be 
had in any other state." See 2 BEALE, CONFUcr OF LAws § 3772 (1935); LEFLAR, CoN-
FLJcr OF LAws § 110 (1959). 
2. See, e.g., Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 202 
(19!15); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. l; Stum-
berg. "The Place of the Wrong"-Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 
388 (1959). 
3. llEsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963): "The 
local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with ,the occurrence 
and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort." 
4, See Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). Cf. Grant v. 
McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 
376, 82 N.W2d 365 (1957); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 
N,W,2d 814 (1959). 
5. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); cf. Haag 
v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 
34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). 
6. In determining the state with the most significant relationship, the place of the 
injury, the place of conduct, the place of -the domicile of the parties, and the place 
of .the relationship, if any, between the parties are to be considered. llEsTATEMENT 
(SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
7. See Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. ]ackson--a Recent Development in Conflict 
of Laws, 63 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 1247, 1248 (1963). 
8. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961); Auten v. Auten, 
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). 
9. This indiscriminate accumulation of contacts has been criticized in Currie, 
supra note 2, at 43; Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 
CORNELL L.Q. 215, 244 (1963); Comment, 51 CAuF. L. R.Ev. 762 (1963). 
10. See generally CURRIE, SELEcrED EssAvs IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963); Hill, 
Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws--a Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm. 
[ 1097] 
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and analyzing the relative significance of each contact in relation to 
the choice of law issue.11 
The decisions in New York reflect the evolution from the tradi-
tional rule to a quantitative and then a qualitative evaluation of 
the contacts. In Auten v. Auten,12 the New York Court of Appeals 
rejected the traditional jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rule for 
contracts in favor of a "grouping of contacts" approach.13 The court 
in Auten, as it later did in Haag v. Barnes,14 made its choice of law 
largely on the basis of the greater number of contacts with one of 
the interested states.15 In Babcock v. ]ackson,16 the "grouping of 
contacts" rule was extended to tort actions, but the court, while 
still speaking in terms of the number of contacts,17 seemed to make 
its choice of law by reference to the interests of the interested states.18 
Subsequently, in the recent case of George v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,19 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, bound by New York 
choice of law rules,20 has apparently applied a qualitative analysis 
in determining the applicable law. 
In George, plaintiffs, residents of Texas, were crewmen on an 
airplane which crashed in Florida in 1958. They brought a warranty 
action in 1963 against the California manufacturer of the airplane21 
in a federal court in New York. New York's borrowing statute bars 
L. REv. 463 (1960); M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws-Professor Currie's Restrained and 
Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 845 (1961) • 
11. Professor Currie has summarized his approach as follows: "(l) When a court 
is asked to apply the law of a foreign state different from the law of the forum, 
it should inquire into the policies expressed in the respective laws, and into the 
circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest 
in the application of those policies. In making these determinations the court should 
employ the ordinary processes of construction and interpretation. (2) If the court 
finds that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in the circum-
stances of the case and the other has none, it should apply the law of the only inter-
ested state." CHEATHAM, GRISWOLD, R.EEsE &: ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 477 (1964). 
12. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). 
13. Id. at 160, 124 N.E.2d at 104. 
14. 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961). 
15. See authorities cited supra note 9. 
16. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). 
17. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 285. See Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1358, 1372 (1964). 
18. See generally Leflar, supra note 7. It is possible to read the majority 
opinion in Babcock as taking the government interest approach. Currie, Comments 
on Babcock v. Jackson-a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1963). In fact, it has been said that the opinion "contains 
items of comfort for almost every critic of the traditional system." Ibid. The court 
identified its approach with that of the Restatement Second. 12 N.Y .2d at 482, 191 
N.E.2d at 283. It is even possible to read the opinion as adopting a jurisdiction-
selecting rule, the place of the formation of the host-guest relationship. See 12 N.Y.2d 
at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284. 
19. 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964). 
20. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
21. The theory of the plaintiffs was that they were third-patty beneficiaries to the 
contract of sale between their employer and the defendant manufacurer. 
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suit on a claim which arises outside the state if the period of 
limitations has expired in the state in which the cause of action 
arose.22 The applicable California statute of limitations barred suit 
after one year,23 while the Florida statute prescribed a longer 
period.2' The district court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that, because the cause of action arose in 
California and the California statute of limitations had run, the suit 
was barred in New York.25 In finding that the cause of action 
arose in California for the purpose of determining the applicable 
substantive law, the district court found that California was the 
state with the greatest number of significant contacts to the warranty 
action. The contract under which plaintiffs sought recovery as 
third-party beneficiaries was made in California; the delivery of 
the airplanes took place in California; and the parties expressly 
stated in the contract of sale that California law would govern.26 
The only contact with Florida was that the accident fortuitously 
happened there. It would seem clear that under the quantitative 
approach of Auten and Haag the substantive law of California 
should govern this warranty action. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, affirmed the dis-
trict court decision, holding that the cause of action was procedurally 
barred by the California statute of limitations; however, in dictum 
it decided that the substantive law defining liability would be that 
of Florida.27 
In determining that Florida substantive law would apply, the 
approach of the court in George, rather than relying on mere 
22. "\Vhere a cause of action arises outside of •this state, an action cannot be 
brought in a court of this state to enforce such cause of action after the expiration 
of the time limited by the laws either of this state or of the state or country where 
the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of action, except 
where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of this state, the 
time limited by the laws of this state shall apply." N.Y. Crv. l'RAc. LAw § 13. 
23. CAL. Crv. l'ROC. CODE § 340(3). This section has been interpreted as applying 
to all personal injury and death actions regardless of whether they are based in tort 
or contract. See, e.g., Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 26, 266 P.2d 
163, 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) • 
24. Florida provides a five-year period for "an action upon any contract, obliga-
tion or liability founded upon an instrument of writing not -under seal." FLA. STAT. 
§ 95.11(3) (1961). A .three-year period is provided for "an action upon a contract, 
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing." FLA. STAT. 
§ 95.11 (5) (1961). As an alternative the court of appeals stated that, if the Florida 
statute was to be applied to this case, the three-year period was appropriate. See 
George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1964). 
25. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Civil No. 63-826, S.D.N.Y., July 23, 1963. 
26. Both the appellant and the appellee agreed with the district court that Cali-
fornia was the state with the most significant contacts, and that its law must apply. 
See Brief for Appellant, p. 5, George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 
1964); Brief for Appellee, p. 5, ibid. 
27. Chief Judge Lumbard joined in the opinion, and Circuit Judge Waterman 
concurred without opinion. See notes 22-24 supra, and text accompanying notes 39-55 
infra. 
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numerical comparisons, was that of examining the policies behind 
the laws of the interested states in order to determine if one of 
the states would not be concerned should the law of the other 
state be applied. Although the court reached a conclusion from this 
examination contrary to that presently to be proposed, its approach 
was essentially in accord with the following analysis. The law of 
California imposes strict liability for injuries resulting from the 
defective manufacture of an airplane.28 California's interest pro-
tected by the imposition of strict liability on a manufacturer would 
seem to be its interest in the general welfare of its residents.29 Since 
its mvn citizens were not plaintiffs in this action, and since the 
accident did not take place within its territory, California is un-
concerned with the application of the lower standard of care im-
posed on manufacturers by Florida law.30 Ordinarily the place of 
injury will have an interest in the compensation of those who render 
medical aid to the injured party. But this interest of Florida would 
not be furthered by the application of a law making it more difficult 
for the plaintiff to recover damages.31 Moreover, Florida would seem 
, to have no interest in this case in the application of its fault-oriented 
law to protect defendants from absolute liability since this defend-
ant was not a resident of that state.32 The situation presented under 
28. See Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Garon 
v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 7 Av. Cas. ,I 17418 (1961). Cf. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber 
Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). 
29. See POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 87 (1953 ed.) 
30. The court said: "An accident caused by a defective product threatens the 
'general security' of the state where the injury occurs rather than of the state of 
delivery, which is often determined by tax or other considerations wholly extraneous 
to ,the instant problem, or even of the state of manufacture." George v. Douglas Air-
craft Co., 332 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1964). However, this may be a parochial inter-
pretation of the policy of California. It is possible that California would adhere to 
its policy of placing the social costs of the enterprise upon local industry regardless 
of where the injury took place and regardless of the residence of the victim. See 
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 
180. Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), If this is the 
correct interpretation of California's policy, rather than the interpretation given by 
the court, then it would seem clear that California law should be applied since Cali-
fornia would have an interest in the application of its law while Florida has no such 
interest. See notes 31-32 infra and accompanying text. 
31. The court in George recognized this interest of Florida in protecting its 
medical creditors, but failed to recognize that Florida would not be concerned as to 
this matter if the California law of strict liability were applied by the New York court. 
In fact, this interest of Florida is clearly better served by the California law than by 
application of the fault-oriented law of Florida because it would be certain to provide 
a fund for the medical creditors. • 
32. The court in George felt that "if a state has decided in general that persons 
injured within its borders by a particular kind of defective chattel should not be 
allowed •to recover against the manufacturer except for negligence, there would be 
little reason to accord a greater degree of protection because the chattel causing the 
injury was made in another state which has shown a broader concern for the general 
welfare of its citizens by imposing strict liability." 332 F.2d at 77. This statement 
April 1965] Recent Developments 1101 
the governmental-interest analysis is the problem of the disinterested 
third state in which reference to the policies of the interested states 
leaves the conflict unresolved,33 although the court in George did 
not recognize it as such.34 Professor Currie, dealing with a prob-
lem similar to the situation involving a true conflict between 
the policies of the interested states,35 proposed that the forum either 
apply its own law, if it coincides with that of one of the interested 
states, 36 or make a choice on the basis of discretionary preference 
between the two conflicting policies.37 In either event, it would 
seem that New York, as the disinterested forum, should apply the 
substantive law of California, because California law is most in 
accord with New York law and because it seems to reflect a more 
modem attitude.38 
However, even though the court in George felt that the law of 
Florida would govern the substantive issues, it held that the statute 
of limitations of California was applicable and that the cause of 
action was precluded by that statute.39 It is generally held that 
statutes of limitations are procedural,40 and thus the limitations 
period is determined by the law of the forum.41 Borrowing statutes, 
by the court fails to address itself adequately to .the policies of protecting defendants 
from absolute liability. The more reasonable interpretation of Florida's policies is that 
it is primarily concerned about protecting its own manufacturers from undue liability, 
thereby subordinating its interest in seeing persons compensated who are injured in 
Florida. Florida should have no concern with the application of California law, 
which will advance the secondary policy of Florida and not encroach upon its 
primary policy. 
!l!l. See generally Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 
754 (196!1). 
!14:. The court in George considered that Florida had an interest in the application 
of its law. See notes !ll and !12 supra. It might be possible to infer from its treatment 
of the problem that when an interest analysis leaves the conflict unresolved the court 
should apply the traditional rule that the law of the place of injury governs. 
!15. Currie, supra note !l!l, at 772. It would seem to make no difference whether 
each of the interested states would prefer that its own law be applied, or whether 
neither would be concerned if the third state applied the law of the other. 
!16. Id. at 779. If the law of the forum does not coincide with the law of one of 
the interested states, application of the law of the forum may be unconstitutional. 
Id. at 780. 
!17. Id. at 778. This places the disinterested third state essentially in the position 
of Congress, and it is contemplated that the forum court would decide in accord with 
the best national interest. See M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 845, 862-67 
(1961). 
!18. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 4!12, 191 N.E.2d 81 
(196!!); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 
!199 (1962). 
!19. !1!12 F.2d at 79. 
40. Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, !ll MICH. L. REv. 474, 
489 (19!1!1). 
41. There are certain exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Boumias v. Atlantic Mari-
time Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955) (limitation so specifically directed at liability 
that it qualified the right). See generally 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note I, § 604.1. 
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however, enacted by a majority of the states,42 often dictate applica• 
tion of the limitations period of a state other than the forum.48 Al-
though these statutes vary greatly,44 most borrowing legislation 
adopts the time bar of the place where the claim arose or accrued.45 
To determine where the cause of action arose for the purpose of 
applying a borrowing statute,46 courts have traditionally applied 
the mechanical rule that a tort arises in the state in which the last 
act necessary to establish liability occurred.47 This has also been the 
rule when the action for injuries sustained is based on a warranty 
theory.48 These decisions are difficult to justify on a policy basis, 
having little relation to the policy factors behind borrowing legisla-
tion-policies requiring plaintiffs to institute suit within a reason-
able time and protecting defendants from an undue extension of 
their responsibility.49 Nevertheless, as with the traditional choice of 
law in tort actions, the rule is simple and easy to apply and is con-
sistent with the traditional notion that the law of a single state 
should govern all aspects of a claim.50 
Babcock v. Jackson clearly contemplates a new approach in de-
ciding where a cause of action arose for the purposes of the borrow-
ing statute. Babcock rejected the notion that the law of a single 
state should govern each issue in a suit and followed instead an 
approach in which the choice of law relevant to each issue is decided 
in accordance with the law of the state which has the most significant 
relationship with that particular issue.51 Under this approach, there 
is no anomaly in the determination in George that for substantive 
purposes the claim arose in Florida and for purposes of the borrow-
ing statute the claim arose in California; indeed, the policy of the 
borrowing statute would seem to dictate the application of Calif. 
ornia law. The court found the legislative purpose behind the 
borrowing statute to be that of protecting the nonresident defend-
42. Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws-Borrowing Statutes, 
32 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 287, 294 (1960). 
43. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 21 (1959); IOWA CODE § 614.7 (1958); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-25 (1959). 
44. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8120 (1953) (exception when period of forum 
is shorter); TENN. Com: ANN. § 28-114 (1955) (exception when one party not a resident 
of place of accrual). See generally Vernon, supra note 42, at 294-96. 
45. Id. at 293-300. 
46. This determination is often a difficult one. Id. at 300; Ester, Borrowing Statutes 
of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 33, 45 (1962); 51 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1290 (1938). 
47. Ester, supra note 46, at 47. See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 
F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955); Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957). 
48. Ester, supra note 46, at 47-48. See, e.g., Moore v. Roschen, 93 F. Supp. 993 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
49. Ester, supra note 46, at 74. 
50. See generally authorities cited supra note I. 
51. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (1963). See Comment, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
1358, 1369 (1964). 
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ant from an indefinite tolling of the limitations period in the forum
state because of his absence from a state in which there was no
reason to expect him to be present.52 Because the place of injury
was fortuitous, and because the tolling provision of the Florida
statute might indefinitely prolong the limitations period in Florida
because of defendant's normal absence from the state,53 the George
case presented the general situation which the New York statute
was intended to govern. In such a case, it would seem clear that
the court's decision to apply the statute of limitations of the place
of manufacture, where the defendant manufacturer will almost
certainly be amenable to suit, is the rule best designed to effectuate
the policy of the New York borrowing statute.54 Although uniform
legislation has been considered by some to be the only solution to
the problem of accomplishing the objectives of borrowing legisla-
tion,55 it would appear that those policies can be effectively accom-
plished under the more modem and flexible conflict of laws rules
and the approach of Babcock and George.
52. 332 F.2d at 78.
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.07 (1961): "If when the cause of action shall accrue against
a person, he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term herein
limited after his return to the state ....
54. The court did not deide it was necessary to consider the possibility that New
York might view the cause of action as arising in both Florida and California. 332 F.2d
at 79, n.6. Compare Pattridge v. Palmer, 201 Minn. 387, 277 N.W. 18 (1937), with
Osgood v. Artt, 10 Fed. 365 (N.D. Il. 1882).
55. Ester, supra note 46, at 74; Vernon, supra note 42, at 323. See Uniform Statutes
of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act, HANDBOOK oF rH NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 264 (1957).
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